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Why has the China-Ethiopia relationship become so important andso close over the last ten years? From the Chinese government’sviewpoint, this country of about 85 million people is largely de-
void of raw materials and other wealth above or below the ground, unlike
the two Sudans, Nigeria, or Angola. It does have some oil and gas in the
eastern desert, the Ogaden, but that is a danger zone: in 2007, nine Chinese
workers from the Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau were killed (and
seven others kidnapped) by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF).
Its minerals are largely unexploited if not unexplored. Moreover, Ethiopia is
among the poorest of the least developed economies, standing 157th (out
of 169 countries) in the UN human development index, with a per capita
GNP of a mere 350 US dollars: (1) even mild drought leads to famines miti-
gated only by of the state’s ability to scramble a response. The effects of
the 2008 economic crisis are still felt despite an annual GNP growth rate
of 8 to 10 percent between 2000 and 2011 and 11.4 percent in 2010-2011.
Further, Ethiopia stands at the heart of the Horn of Africa, an area of high
unrest, consisting of a failed state (Somalia), an isolated problem neighbour
(Eritrea), a quasi-state (Somaliland), and a newly independent state that
has yet to achieve stability (South Sudan). (2)
Nevertheless, China is very much present in Ethiopia and enjoys a close
and special relationship with its government. This article will show that,
on both sides, the establishment of this partnership was motivated as
much by diplomatic, strategic, and even ideological considerations as
economic ones. To stretch this hypothesis further, for Beijing’s purposes,
economic and trade cooperation with Addis Ababa is a means rather than
an end in itself. For Ethiopia, however, partnership with China mainly
serves the internal political and economic purposes of the regime that
has been in place since 1991, under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi for 20
years and, since his death in August 2012, under his successor Haile-
mariam Desalegn.
Among China’s reasons are Addis Ababa being the seat of the African
Union’s (AU’s) headquarters as well as that of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (ECA); Ethiopia’s position as the second most popu-
lous country in the continent after Nigeria, expected to have a population
of 170 million by 2050; its regional, even continental role; its strategic lo-
cation, especially its control of the Blue Nile’s source (Lake Tana); the size
of its needs in terms of development; and finally its political stability, the
government’s authoritarian character, and the state’s economic centrality.
Ethiopia’s interest is that China is actively engaged in its economic devel-
opment and, as elsewhere in Africa, helps opening the game: its loans and
infrastructure projects, its accessibility, its affinities with Prime Minister
Meles’s “Colbertist” development model – all these factors also nurture the
partnership.
The relationship is not without difficulties and imbalances that could trip
up the rapprochement in the future, or at least cause upsets or diminish its
importance. For the moment, though, Beijing is strengthening its presence
in Addis Ababa, which Ethiopians like to improperly refer to as “Africa’s cap-
ital.” (3) Ethiopia is part of the group of so-called “Sino-optimist” countries,
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as against “Sino-pragmatists” and “Sino-pessimists,” going by the categories
proposed by Seifudein Adem. (4) Ethiopia is now seduced by China’s eco-
nomic success somewhat like, mutatis mutandis, it was attracted in 1920-
1930 by the success of Japan, the first non-Western power to modernise. (5)
China-Ethiopia relations since 1991: Gradual
forging of a special partnership
Emperor Haile Selassie established diplomatic relations with the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) in 1970, but the 1974 revolution, which led to the
emergence of a regime close to the Soviet Union, provoked a distancing of
Addis Ababa-Beijing links until the late 1980s. It was not until the armed
opposition victory in 1991, the fall of the Mengistu regime, and the rise to
power of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
led by Meles Zenawi that bilateral relations began to experience real
growth. (6)
The EPRDF, which took power with US backing, did not initially give pri-
ority to strengthening ties with China. The regime favoured market economy
(except in such matters as land ownership and maintenance of state mo-
nopolies) and declared its willingness to establish a federal and democratic
polity. It was only in 1995, following a long debate over strengthening its
hand in dealing with the West, that the regime decided to rebalance its for-
eign policy in favour of Russia and China. Especially from China, the main
leaders of the EPRDF wanted to learn about “socialist market economy” and
agricultural development. (7)
In October 1995, following his victory in the first democratic elections in
Ethiopia, Prime Minister Meles (8) visited China, and President Jiang Zemin
stopped over in Addis Ababa as part of an extensive Africa tour six months
later. An ambitious Agreement on Trade, Economic and Technical Coopera-
tion (ATEC) was signed. Automatically renewed every three years, the agree-
ment led to the creation in 1998 of a Joint Economic Commission, which
meets every other year. The agreement confers “most favoured nation” sta-
tus on Ethiopia and covers the whole bilateral economic cooperation, be it
in the matter of investment promotion through the formation of Sino-
Ethiopian joint ventures or private entities, maritime transport, or exchanges
of “technical personnel.”
Since then, Sino-Ethiopian links have continued to strengthen. During a
meeting in Beijing of the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
in 2000, Addis Ababa was chosen to host the second forum in December
2003. Ethiopia thus found itself in a privileged position, which the Meles
regime used to promote a close diplomatic partnership between Beijing and
Addis Ababa. (9) At the summit attended by Premier Wen Jiabao, several sup-
plementary agreements were signed.
In 2005, Sino-Ethiopian relations genuinely entered a new phase of close
diplomatic, political, and economic partnership. This evolution has a direct
link to the Meles regime’s hardening as well as the strengthening of his pow-
ers following the 2005 elections, during which the opposition managed to
take a third of the parliament seats, and in the face of rising Western criti-
cism. The election was tainted with numerous irregularities and was accom-
panied by much violence (at least 200 dead), and led to a rapid deterioration
in relations between Ethiopia and its traditional donors (the United States
and European Union), which began to attach conditions to, if not suspend,
their assistance. (10) Meles then adopted a veritable developmentalist state
agenda. And this authoritarian direction was confirmed during the May 2010
elections: the now muzzled, intimidated, and marginalised opposition won
just two of the 547 seats in a parliament almost entirely controlled by the
EPRDF, which was accused of having established a “one-party state.” (11)
A close political partnership
Since 1995 and even more so in the last ten years, Ethiopia and China
have forged a much closer political partnership. Although the term “strategic
partnership” has never been used, the relationship does clearly resemble
one. For the Ethiopian government, it is a “close relationship” that is bound
to play a major role in the country’s ambitious development and poverty
reduction projects launched in the same era. Moreover, from Addis Ababa’s
viewpoint, Beijing is more than that: it is a partner that could also share its
economic experiences and extend technical assistance as well as diplomatic
support. (12) For his part, Meles made many political gestures. In 2006, the
Ethiopian parliament lent its support to China’s anti-secession law (regard-
ing Taiwan), and as a member of the UN Human Rights Council until 2007,
Ethiopia (along with other African countries) helped defeat all motions crit-
icising the Chinese regime.
There are frequent exchanges of leaders’ visits. Meles visited China four
times, the last in August 2011, and as during his previous visits (1995, 2004,
and 2006) was received by top Chinese leaders, including President Hu Jin-
tao. As noted earlier, Premier Wen Jiabao visited Addis Ababa for the second
FOCAC session in 2003. Other visits included those of National People’s
Congress Chairman Wu Bangguo in 2008, Commerce Minister Chen Deming
in 2009, and the Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference and no. 4 in the Party, Jia Qingling, in January 2012 for the open-
ing of a new AU headquarters financed and built by China (at a cost of $200
million). The two countries’ foreign ministers meet regularly, almost once a
year. It may be noted, however, that Hu Jintao, who was to have taken part
in this inauguration, has never visited Ethiopia.
Exchanges of visits are not limited to the two sides’ top leaders but also
include delegations of all kinds – commercial, cultural, medical, military, and
increasingly visits from provinces, all of which highlights the diversity of co-
operation.
Commercial ties have become institutionalised the most rapidly. In 2006,
the Ethiopian government signed a major framework agreement on financ-
ing with the China EXIM Bank, leading to a rapid rise in the number of Chi-
nese infrastructure projects (discussed later). The framework agreement
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requires all exports to China to be overseen by the Commercial Bank of
Ethiopia, the largest state-owned financial institution. Ethiopia intends ex-
port earnings to help pay back Chinese loans and is adopting an “Angolan
model” of financing its development, despite its lack of oil wealth. (13)
Exchanges have also extended to inter-party relations, especially between
the Chinese Communist Party and the EPRDF. They began in earnest during
the Ethiopia visit in February 2000 of Dai Bingguo, then director of the Party’s
International Liaison Department. They grew further notably with the China
visit in May 2002 of Kassu Ilala, then vice-president of the Southern Ethiopian
People’s Democratic Movement, which joined the EPRDF in 2005. Ilala was
also the minister in charge of infrastructure. More recently, in September
2010, Zhang Xuan, deputy secretary of the Party’s municipal committee for
Chongqing (which established special economic ties with Ethiopia with the
opening of a Lifan car factory in Dukem, near Addis Ababa, in 2007), took
part in the 8th organisational congress of the EPRDF. A month later, Ai Ping,
vice-minister of the Party’s international liaison department, led a delegation
to Addis Ababa, where the two parties signed a “memorandum on exchange
and cooperation between the CPC and the EPRDF.” (14) Highlighting their pol-
icy convergences, the two parties have developed exchanges on issues such
as ruling party organisation and succession strategies. (15)
China’s embassy in Addis Ababa is particularly active and has direct deal-
ings with most Ethiopian ministries; every year, more than half of the cab-
inet, led by the prime minister, takes part in the October 1 Chinese national
day festivities, a privilege not accorded to any other mission. In another
symbolic development, Seyoum Mefsin, who was Ethiopia’s foreign minister
from 1991 to 2010, was named ambassador to China this year. (16)
Relations with China are thus essential for Ethiopia. From Beijing’s per-
spective, Addis Ababa is a valuable regional launch pad. The Chinese Com-
merce Ministry (which maintains offices independent of the embassy in
several countries) and the China-Africa Development Fund (but not the
China Exim Bank) have independent representation in Addis Ababa. The Xin-
hua News Agency, which is very active in Ethiopia, has its regional head-
quarters for the Horn of Africa in Addis Ababa. Several Chinese scholars,
especially from the Institute of African Studies of Zhejiang Normal Univer-
sity, live in the country on a permanent basis. In 2003, during the 2nd FOCAC
summit, China decided to accord Ethiopia the Approved Destination Status
for Chinese tourists, although visitors are predominantly traders or immi-
grants rather than visitors with tourism in mind. (17)
Cultural cooperation in education and training:
Extending China’s “soft power”
Cultural cooperation in the education field is longstanding but has grown
rapidly since the middle of the last decade. Largely China-driven, it is mainly
aimed at strengthening its economic implantation but also its soft power in
Ethiopia. This cooperation is centred on technical cooperation in agriculture,
mining, communications, and energy. More recently it was extended to train-
ing journalists and senior officials. Thus, every year since 2006, 200 members
of national and regional administrations have undertaken short training stints
in China; in fact these are more in the nature of study tours for displaying
the success of China’s rise. It is a strategy to influence Ethiopian elites.
In February 2010, vice-minister of education Li Weihong led a delegation
to Ethiopia to inaugurate the country’s first Confucius Institute. (18) Based at
the Ethio-China Polytechnic College (in which Beijing invested $30 million)
in Addis Ababa, the institute gives free training to not only language teachers
(28 by late 2010) but also Ethiopian diplomats (24) and officials from 19
different ministries, thus imparting the CCP authorities’ viewpoint on Chi-
nese civilisation. (19) In 2011, the Confucius Institute in Addis Ababa signed
cooperation agreements with three Ethiopian universities in order to set up
Chinese language teaching centres (Mekelle University, 780 km north of the
capital, Addis Ababa University, and Hawassa University, 400 km south of
the capital). (20) The number of Ethiopian students trained free in China rose
by 47, to 118 in 2008. (21)
Finally, since 2005, Ethiopia has benefited most from a Chinese pro-
gramme of young volunteers in service to Africa. Numbering 300 in the
whole continent and reminiscent of the US “Peace Corps,” these volunteers
offer free teaching for a year in disciplines as diverse as agronomy, sports,
and information technology; they are paid $200 a month. (22)
A not inconsequential military cooperation
China-Ethiopia military cooperation is of a not negligible size, even if it is
not comparable to that between the United States and Ethiopia, especially
since 11 September 2001. Restructured after the conflict with Eritrea in
2000 and now 130,000 strong, the Ethiopian army is considered one of the
most experienced and operational military machines in Africa. (23) Apparently
Addis Ababa does not hold it against Beijing for having equipped two camps
during the conflict with Asmara between 1998 and 2000, in contravention
of a UN embargo on the two countries ($1 billion worth of arms to the two
countries). In 2005, Prime Minister Meles hosted General Zhu Wenquan, a
key commander in charge of the Nanjing military region, and signed an am-
bitious military cooperation agreement (training, exchange of technologies,
and peace-keeping mission). (24)
China now supplies artillery, light armoured vehicles, and troop transport
vehicles to the Ethiopian army. Every year it trains an undisclosed number
(perhaps ten) of Ethiopian officers. There are regular exchanges of visits: for
instance, in June 2010, the Ethiopian armed forces chief of staff, General
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Samora Yenus, visited China for the first time and met a number of the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army (PLA) top brass, including the vice-chairman of the
central military commission, Xu Caihou, and his counterpart Chen Bingde. (25)
In 2007, Ethiopia was one of 14 African countries where the Chinese em-
bassy had a military attaché.
Meanwhile, whereas the Ethiopian armed forces retain large quantities of
Soviet equipment (aircraft and tanks), they are modernising with help
mainly from the United States, Italy, Russia, and Israel. Their cooperation
with China should not be overblown.
Undeniable diplomatic and strategic convergences
In diplomatic and strategic terms, the two countries share many view-
points and interests. While a fierce proponent of equality among states,
non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and national sovereignty,
Ethiopia, like China, is much engaged in the UN system. The two countries
play an active role, for instance, in UN peacekeeping operations. Ethiopia
has more personnel on the ground: especially in Darfur, Liberia, Burundi, and
above all today in the Abyei area on the border between the two Sudans. (26)
China is also present in Darfur, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC). Ethiopia also contributes to the fight against international
terrorism by cooperating with US forces stationed in Djibouti (Combined
Joint Task Force — Horn of Africa). This by no means displeases China, which
is itself engaged in combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and is very hostile
to political Islam.
China welcomes Ethiopia’s regional role, considering it a stabilising one
so long as it does not go about formally modifying borders – and for in-
stance forcibly imposing in Eritrea an opening to the sea in the Assab re-
gion, as often hinted by some in Addis Ababa. In China’s view, Ethiopia’s
political economic and security presence is welcome in South Sudan,
where Beijing quickly adapted to the independence declared on 9 July
2011 by transforming the active consulate it had maintained in Juba into
an embassy. Further, using their respective influence, China and Ethiopia
worked in close concert (along with the United States, incidentally) in fa-
cilitating the signing of an oil agreement between the two Sudans in Au-
gust 2012.
China has been even more pragmatic with regard to Somaliland, an entity
de facto independent of Mogadishu since its unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence in 1991. Somaliland enjoys close relations with Ethiopia, and
Addis Ababa sees in Berbera an alternative outlet to the sea that reduces
its near total dependence on Djibouti. Although the Chinese government is
attached to well-known principles and is disinclined to recognise the quasi-
state, it has developed since at least 2010 semi-official relations with the
de facto authorities in Hargeisa, capital of Somaliland, to take part in de-
veloping the “Berbera corridor,” a European Union-financed project. In Jan-
uary that year, Somaliland’s civil aviation minister Waran Adde headed an
economic and commercial delegation to Beijing to sign an agreement on
the modernisation and expansion of Egal International Airport at Hargeisa
(named after late president Mohamed Ibrahim Egal), as well as restoration
of the capital’s road network. (27) Two months later, in March 2010, a major
Chinese government and business delegation visited Hargeisa for the first
time and met a number of leaders, including the then president of Soma-
liland, Dahir Rayale. (28) A year later, the Hong Kong-based Chinese oil com-
pany PetroTrans, which has a stake in oil and gas exploration in the Ogaden
(discussed later), responded to a call for bids to modernise and expand the
Berbera port. (29) Competing with France’s Bolloré group but offering a much
lower bid and a more attractive “package,” the Chinese firm won the bid a
few months later, following the first China visit of Somaliland’s newly
elected president, Ahmed M. Silanyo, in August 2011. Although Beijing and
the Xinhua News Agency prudently made no announcement of official
meetings, Chinese leaders were very much associated with negotiations. At
any rate, trilateral agreements (among China, Somaliland, and Ethiopia)
signed during the visit covered the installation of a gas pipeline and an oil
pipeline to the Ogaden, construction of a refinery in Berbera, and renovation
of the road linking Berbera, Hargeisa, and Tug Wajala, the city on Ethiopia’s
border. (30)
Finally, in 2006 and in 2008-2009 as well as in 2011, the Ethiopian army’s
role in Somalia was deemed useful by China, especially by those in the PLA
who had often expressed frustration at not being able to intervene on the
ground to end piracy in the Gulf of Aden. (31)
Flourishing but asymmetric economic cooperation
China’s economic and commercial relations with Ethiopia are character-
istic of those it has developed with all developing countries that have large
populations – and hence a potentially vast domestic market – and enor-
mous infrastructure needs but are devoid of raw materials for export. In this
regard, as in the case of Egypt or Pakistan, relations are flourishing but re-
main highly asymmetric. The asymmetry is less pronounced than in the
case of smaller African states (Togo, Sierra Leone, or even Senegal). But un-
like Luanda or Khartoum, Addis Ababa cannot for the present at least pay
for its extensive purchases by selling products for which Beijing has a strate-
gic need (oil, gas, copper, or timber). As elsewhere in Africa, relations are
dominated by a rapidly expanding trade, but with the balance remaining
heavily in China’s favour, and infrastructure projects only adding to the Chi-
nese trade surplus. Chinese investments as such have had a slow start, but
have helped a more recent and still modest rise in Ethiopian exports, espe-
cially to China. The Ethiopian government’s long-term strategy is to reduce
the immense trade deficit and external debt through industrialisation and
agriculture development. However, both deficit and debt have continued
to pile up, thanks in part to the extent of Chinese assistance, which as else-
where in Africa has strings attached.
It is clear that in China’s case it is not easy to distinguish between what
Beijing calls “win-win economic cooperation” and aid. While infrastructure
projects include grants and preferential loans, Chinese assistance has grad-
ually diversified since the 2006 FOCAC and especially since the 2009 one,
partly taking on board Addis Ababa’s criticisms. Nevertheless, the Chinese
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cooperation model has yet to evolve, inciting Ethiopia to diversify its part-
nerships as much as possible. (32)
China-Ethiopia trade exchanges
In 2006 China became Ethiopia’s main trade partner. Ethiopian and Chi-
nese figures don’t tally, but the difference is far more modest than in the
case of major trade partners such as South Africa. One reason for this is the
shortcomings of Ethiopian statistical machinery.
Ethiopian figures cited by the European Union show that from 2001-2002
to 2009-2010, Beijing-Addis Ababa trade grew more than ten-fold, from
$153 million to $1,693 million, representing 16.5 percent of Ethiopia’s for-
eign trade value. (33) Of course, in 2009-2010, Ethiopia did more trade with
the EU as a whole ($2.516 billion or 24.5 percent of its total foreign trade),
but it was with China that Ethiopia had the largest deficit: $1.261 billion, or
more than 20 percent of Addis Ababa’s trade deficit and 5.3 percent of its
GNP.
Chinese official figures show bilateral trade rocketing from $100 million
in 2002 (calendar year) to $1.467 billion in 2009, Ethiopian imports rising
very fast (to $1.252 billion against $96 million in 2002), but with a some-
what lower deficit of $1.038 billion in the latter year. Even if the time lag
between the two sets of figures is taken into account, the gap is not that
significant: China has emerged as Ethiopia’s main source of trade deficit.
By way of comparison, the deficit with the EU in 2009-2010 was just $871
million. The United States was far behind, with $597 million worth of trade,
accounting for a mere 5.8 percent of Ethiopia’s foreign trade and enjoying
a surplus of $442 million. (34)
The share of Ethiopian imports from China in Ethiopia’s total imports dou-
bled between 2001/02 and 2009/10, rising from 9 percent of the country’s
total external purchases to 18 percent. Ethiopia mainly buys equipment and
machines from China, as do many other countries on the continent (South
Africa, Angola, Nigeria, and Sudan); (35) but it also imports rising quantities
of electronic and other consumption goods (garments, pharmaceuticals,
and edibles).
Exports to China have also grown, to $216 million worth in 2009/10 ($246
million in 2010). Ethiopia mainly sells China coffee, leather, textiles, sesame,
and cut flowers.
In an effort to reduce Addis Ababa’s trade deficit, the two sides signed an
agreement in January 2010 on preferential access for Ethiopian products in
the Chinese market: the number of products exported to China tariff-free
rose from 130 to 440, or 95 percent of the total. While Ethiopia’s trade
deficit is structural, the low prices of Chinese products heighten the pro-
found asymmetry in bilateral exchanges. Sino-Ethiopian trade is forecast to
reach $3 billion by 2015, but it is less likely that Addis Ababa’s trade deficit
with China will radically narrow in the coming years.
The case of the footwear industry
With Africa’s largest livestock population, Ethiopia has since the 1920s
been producing leather, goatskin, and sheepskin. It has an indigenous leather
and footwear industry. In 2000-2001, there was a rapid rise in cheap
footwear imports from China, risking the collapse of local enterprises. How-
ever, while at first the Chinese imports were highly attractive because they
were cheap ($1 to $2 a pair), they were quickly revealed to be of poor qual-
ity and were shunned by Ethiopian buyers. At the same time, with help from
the Ethiopian ministry of trade and industry and foreign investment –
mainly European but also Chinese (some 20 companies) – local leather and
footwear enterprises were modernised. They imported high-performance
equipment tax free and entered the international market, managing to apply
the brakes on external purchases and raising leather exports. (36) More re-
cently, in November 2011, in order to stimulate industry and following the
example of many other countries (India, Pakistan, etc.), Ethiopia decided to
ban the export of semi-finished skins (tanned but not dyed) destined for
footwear production (crust). This step led many new Chinese firms to set
up shop in Ethiopia, some with assistance from the China-Africa Develop-
ment Fund.
The question is whether this success will remain exceptional. Be that as it
may, the lesson is that new competition from Chinese imports in a given
sector can stimulate enterprises and local production in that sector if there
is clear governmental support as well as backing from other investors (Ital-
ians in the case of footwear). In other words, this examples shows that
African countries’ adaptation to the new international economic context
depends on state capacity to react and impose negotiation with economic
partners, especially in emerging countries, and the quality of local govern-
ment as well as more generally the climate they are able to offer foreign
investors in terms of security and infrastructures (power, transport).
Infrastructure projects
As with many other (developing) African countries, it is major infrastruc-
ture projects that lend high visibility to China’s presence in Ethiopia. Be-
tween 2001 and 2007, they accounted for 10 percent of all Chinese
infrastructure projects in Africa, behind Nigeria (34 percent) and Angola (20
percent) and more than Sudan’s share (8 percent). (37) The three major sectors
of Chinese activity are roads, energy, and communications. A recent addition
is the building of a modern trans-border rail network. Many sectors are
deemed a priority in the Ethiopian government’s national development
strategy. The pattern of approval, financing, and implementation of Chinese
infrastructure projects is now well known: the two governments together
choose them or a Chinese company wins the bid following a call for tenders;
the projects are financed by Chinese banks with commercial loans guaran-
teed by the government and often at concessional terms (low interest, with
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a five-year grace period and a grant component of over 35 percent). The
projects are almost exclusively carried out by Chinese national or provin-
cial-level state firms, which get the financing directly in whole or in part.
Strictly speaking, these are not investments, even though the Ethiopian
Investment Agency treats them as such. (38) While Addis Ababa retains
some margin of manœuverability in the choice of projects and loan al-
locations, this freedom is often slim given its position as recipient, even
with regard to the number of Chinese workers allocated to each proj-
ect. (39)
As with other African countries, whether or not tenders are called, the
Ethiopian government turns to Chinese firms for a series of well-known rea-
sons: the generally lower initial quote, advantageous financing conditions,
and quick orders and execution of projects, even if the quality is often poor
(especially in the case of roads, bridges, and communications systems).
Moreover, different projects may be bundled as a “package.”
In Ethiopia as in most African countries, Beijing’s loans are mainly chan-
nelled through the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank, 2006 agree-
ment) and to a lesser extent through the China Development Bank (CDB)
and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). The China-Africa
Development Fund, established by the CDB in 2007 with a capital of $5 bil-
lion, also funds some projects, especially in the private sector: glass, cement,
or leather factories (see investments).
The financing is sometimes given to Ethiopian public enterprises in charge
of implementing projects. But more often it is the Chinese enterprises that
are funded.
In 2007, China chose Ethiopia as one of four African partners (the others
being Angola, DRC, and Nigeria) allowed to obtain soft loans from Chinese
state-owned financial institutions, especially EXIM Bank.
Although the Chinese authorities have been saying over the past few years
that the grant part of project financing is as high as 25 percent, a ratio sim-
ilar to those of OECD and Paris Club countries (but lower than the IMF-rec-
ommended 35 percent), the actual amounts are generally treated as
confidential, and in Ethiopia’s case are insignificant except for road projects
(35.8 percent of the $349 million allocated) and telecommunications (23.4
percent of the $1.4 billion allocated). For the two hydroelectric projects in
which China is engaged ($400 million and $470 million), the grant part
makes up 12 percent. The grace period is about three years (but seven years
for roads), and the loans mature at the end of ten years (20 years for roads).
Finally, the interest rate for these projects are not all that advantageous
(LIBOR + 1.8 percent to 2.35 percent). (40) Beijing does not grant direct budg-
etary assistance to Addis Ababa, either.
In this context, the financing and construction of the new AU headquarters
was both symbolic and an exception. Entirely funded by a Chinese grant of
$200 million and inaugurated with great pomp in January 2012, it symbol-
ises Sino-African “friendship” and “solidarity” and also aims at showing that
Beijing attaches as much importance to the continental organisation as to
bilateral relations with individual African capitals, which is far from being
the case in reality.
Road projects
This is perhaps the best known facet of China’s presence in Ethiopia. Of-
fering the lowest bids and all too often defying all competition, Chinese
companies have over the past ten years prevailed in most tenders for road
projects. In 2007, it was estimated that Chinese firms controlled 50 to 60
percent of this sector; in 2011, the Chinese share rose from 70 percent to
80 percent. The financing sources for these projects are diverse (World Bank,
EU, African Development Bank, or Ethiopian government), although Beijing
grants major assistance in the form of soft loans or indirect financial help
to Chinese firms engaged in the country.
Energy projects: Dams and high-tension lines
China has mainly invested in building hydraulic dams (such as Tekeze,
completed in 2009), including highly controversial projects (Gibe III) and
high-tension lines. The objective is both political – it is difficult to avoid re-
calling the Soviet precedent with the Aswan Dam, the construction of which
was shunned by the West and international organisations for partly similar
(ecological) reasons – and economic: the sale of power in the national mar-
ket and to neighbouring countries would help Ethiopia repay loans from
Chinese banks (EXIM Bank and CDB). In 2011, Ethiopia produced 2,000
megawatts (MW). This is set to rise five-fold to 10,000 MW by 2015. The
country’s hydroelectric generation capacity is estimated at 40,000 MW,
hence the ongoing ambitious projects. Apart from Gibe III, IV, and V, Ethiopia
has since 2011 been building the Millennium dam to emerge as eastern
Africa’s powerhouse. These projects are part of the East African Power Pool
launched in 2005.
Gibe III has drawn much criticism: built at the confluence of Gilgel Gibe
and Omo rivers, 470 km southwest of Addis Ababa, it led to the forced dis-
placement of 200,000 rural folk, with adverse effects on the water source
of Lake Turkana in northern Kenya, thus putting at risk 300,000 Kenyans’
access to water. In August 2011, the UN’s World Heritage Committee joined
in criticising the project.
In view of these environmental factors, the World Bank and the European
Investment Bank, which financed more modest dams on the Omo (Gibe I
and II), as well as the African Development Bank have refused to take part
in Gibe III. It was thus that China entered the fray: in 2010, the state-owned
Dongfang Electric Machinery Company agreed to supply electrical and me-
chanical equipment (turbines) funded by a $500 million ICBC loan. Another
Chinese company, with EXIM Bank financing, agreed to build a high-tension
line network supplying the capital. However, the main builder in this project
is an Italian firm (Salini Costruttori S.p.A), which won the contract from the
Ethiopian government without a call for tenders in 2006 and began building
the dam at the end of that year. (41)
In sum, this example illustrates China’s propensity for assisting developing
countries by aligning itself with the ambitions of governments in place and
turning a deaf ear to objections from abroad and from experts. Of course,
these projects constitute a new source of export earnings for Ethiopia. But
the financing of the most recent of them as well as farmers’ access to high-
tension lines have to be seen cautiously. Their impact on rural development
is therefore open to question.
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Telecommunications
China is also highly active in the telecommunications sector. ZTE (Zhongx-
ing Telecommunication Equipment), which entered Ethiopia in 1996, has
dominated the market since 2006, when it entered into an agreement with
the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation. This was made possible by
the Chinese government’s decision to help ZTE, which had been facing fi-
nancial difficulties at the time (and was on the verge of bankruptcy). ZTE
has since played a vital role in modernising Ethiopia’s telecommunications.
It has rapidly installed a vast mobile telephone network, with 1.2 million
lines in Addis Ababa and eight other cities, and that has provided access to
many rural people as well. Between 2007 and 2012, the number of mobile
phone users rose from 1 million to 15 million. Ongoing GSM and CDMA
network projects would eventually cover 64 percent and 90 percent of the
country, respectively. ZTE is also said to have trained about 1,000 Ethiopian
engineers. (42)
However, the quality of these installations has drawn much criticism. At
the initiative of Addis Ababa, which sought to balance its overly constrain-
ing dependence on ZTE, a contract was signed in 2010 by Ethiopian Tele-
com and France Telecom under which the French entity would manage its
counterpart. (43) France Telecom’s entry and its oversight of ETC’s moderni-
sation projects helped strengthen the Ethiopian firm’s hand in imposing
more rigorous norms and quality control on ZTE. This management change
offers an interesting but rather exceptional case of a recipient’s capacity
to react and adjust to a situation perceived as too unbalanced and detri-
mental.
Railways
Sino-Ethiopian cooperation and partnership in infrastructure projects also
include modernisation of Addis Ababa’s airport and the building of a national
and international rail network of about 2,600 km by 2015 and 5,060 km by
2020 at a total cost of $6 billion. (44)
It is the Ethiopian government’s latest and most ambitious plan. It aims
to link 49 cities with the construction of eight main lines and also connect
Ethiopian railways with those of the two Sudans and Kenya as well as re-
store the link with Djibouti. On the anvil since the mid-2000s, the project
could not proceed for lack of funds until China stepped in to help. In 2009,
Ethiopian Railways Corporation (ERC) called for tenders, and by May 2010,
only China had responded. Although India was also interested, it could not
bid within the scheduled time. (45)
ERC’s first target was to rebuild the railway line linking Addis Ababa with
Djibouti, whose port accounts for about 70 percent of Ethiopia’s external
trade. But instead of renovating the old 781 kms of narrow-gauge railway
built by the French between 1897 and 1917, a new single track was to be
built close to the old one up to the Djibouti border (656 km).
Other projects notably include the rail link from Addis Ababa to Afar, where
potassium can be extracted from the Denakil depression near the borders
of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. Another is the link between Addis Ababa
and Bedele city, west of the capital and one of the main coal mining areas
of Ethiopia. But China has yet to show interest in these projects.
Partly because of this, Ethiopia revised its plan in March 2011, the new
objective being the construction of 2,395 km of railways by 2015 at a cost
of $4.5 billion. (46) Eventually the line is to join the networks of the Sudans
and Kenya (despite gauge differences).
These infrastructure projects have, however, led to a rapid rise in Ethiopia’s
borrowings from China, the volume of debt rising from $46 million in 2000-
2001 to $1.4 billion in 2009-2010, or 25 percent of Ethiopia’s total debt.
According to some estimates, in 2011, China’s share had risen to half of
Ethiopia’s total debt ($3 to $4 billion out of $7 to $8 billion). (47) Having said
that, in May 2007, Beijing agreed to write off $18.5 million in debts owed
by Addis Ababa, a decision that suggests more such relief in the future. (48)
Chinese investments as yet modest
China is not a major investor in Ethiopia – not yet, at any rate: it is in third
or fourth place, depending on the years, behind India ($2.5 billion divided
among 1,230 projects in June 2010), Saudi Arabia, and the United States.
This is because of difficulties in investing in the country but also due to
the Chinese strategy of implantation, which favours infrastructure projects
funded through loans and grants and carried out with a major presence of
Chinese workers (discussed later) rather than through the creation of en-
terprises and participation in the Ethiopian economy’s productive (and ex-
port) sectors. However, under pressure from Addis Ababa and public opinion,
things are beginning to change.
By late 2010, Ethiopia was in 8th place among African countries with Chi-
nese investments ($368 million), well below South Africa ($4.2 billion) and
Nigeria ($1.2 billion). It should be noted that Chinese investments in Africa
in the years 2004-2010, totalling $13 billion, constituted no more than 4.1
percent of China’s direct investments abroad. Chinese investments in
Ethiopia represent a mere 0.1 percent of China’s total investments abroad
($317 billion). (49)
The volume of Chinese investments is probably greater than this estimate.
In fact some of them originate in Hong Kong or tax havens (Cayman or Virgin
Islands). But the Ethiopian Investment Agency’s figure ($3 billion in 2011) is
suspect because it includes, as noted earlier, infrastructure projects but also
because it covers investment contracts or agreements rather that amounts
actually invested. (50) These variations stem from the slow implementation of
projects: in 2009, just 23 percent of projects were operational, representing 10
percent of the total capital invested, hence the distortion in the statistics. (51)
The sectors Chinese enterprises have invested in include construction
(about two thirds of capital invested), glass and leather industries, automo-
biles, and to a lesser extent textiles and agriculture. The rapid rise in Chinese
investments in 2009 was due to the construction of two major cement fac-
tories, totalling nearly $600 million.
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Eastern Industrial Park
In 2008, China was given some 200 ha of land at Dukem, 35 km southeast
of Addis Ababa in the Oromia region, to set up a vast special economic zone,
the Eastern Industrial Park, expected to extend eventually to 1,000 ha. For
China, it is one seven SEZs in Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria (2), Mauritius,
and Zambia). (52) The zone gets funding from a consortium of Chinese public
and private enterprises. However, in 2011, Chinese investments in Dukem
amounted a mere $100 million, despite the Ethiopian government’s incen-
tives (low-cost land, cheap labour, and tax exemptions). Unlike the Nigerian
and Egyptian SEZs, Dukem exclusively hosts Chinese investments.
China’s return to the energy sector
The tragic circumstances in which China pulled out of this sector in 2007
have been noted. (53) Recent Chinese projects in Somaliland as well as new
Ethiopian assurances in terms of security seem to have persuaded Chinese
firms to reengage in oil and gas exploration and exploitation in the Ogaden.
In July 2011, the Ethiopian mining ministry allotted to the aforementioned
Chinese company, PetronTrans, the natural gas fields of Calub and Hilala as
well as eight exploration blocs in the area officially called Somali Regional
State, after the departure in March of Malaysia’s Petronas. PetroTransis ex-
pected to invest $4 billion in these projects, including the construction of a
gas pipeline and an oil pipeline to Berbera, probably with assistance from
SinoPec or CNPC.
Meanwhile, security problems do not seem to have been fully overcome: in
August 2011, the Resolve Ogaden Coalition, a front of the ONFL, renewed its
demand that foreign oil companies leave the region; the following month,
PetroTrans denied a report that ONFL rebels had attacked a convoy of its tech-
nicians that was being escorted by the army, leaving 25 Ethiopian soldiers dead.
In any case, two things are certain. On the one hand, Addis Ababa is de-
termined to do all in its power to facilitate PetroTrans’s work: its activities
in the Ogaden are now protected by federal authorities’ special forces. On
the other hand, although diminishing, foreign oil and gas companies con-
tinue to run major risks in the zone. (54)
Agriculture cooperation
China has little presence in Ethiopia’s agriculture, although it still represents
50 percent of GNP and 85 percent of exports, and employs 80 percent of the
workforce. Whereas China has in recent years signed major contracts for leas-
ing land in the DRC and Zambia, for instance (2 million hectares and 2.8 mil-
lion hectares respectively), it has remained cautious in Ethiopia, perhaps
because of the many criticisms that followed agreements to lease land to
Saudi Arabian and Indian entities and also due to the presence of several
Western partners (Netherlands and Belgium) in floriculture, which has
emerged as a new export sector. (55) For the present, China prefers training and
technology transfers carried out with the help of development assistance.
Development aid and humanitarian aid
Unveiled during successive Sino-African summits (FOCAC), China’s devel-
opment assistance to Africa has diversified and intensified. Ethiopia is per-
haps one of the very few African countries to benefit from the whole gamut
of Chinese “cooperation” programmes, Beijing having only recently adopted
the notion of public assistance for development. The assistance focuses on
agriculture (irrigation) and medical (hospital) projects. (56)
In total, Beijing’s direct assistance (in the strict sense) to Addis Ababa remains
rather modest given the strength of bilateral political and economic relations.
It relates to projects that are small in number but of high symbolic value. In
2006, it amounted to $1 million, or 0.14 percent of total aid received by
Ethiopia that year ($758 million). (57) This is due in part to the size of the assis-
tance Ethiopia receives from traditional donors (US, EU) and also to China’s
“win-win” strategy of favouring South-South cooperation over conventional
aid. Nevertheless, Chinese development assistance in Africa has risen, the vol-
ume estimated to rank alongside mid-level donors such as Canada or Italy. (58)
"China Model" for Ethiopia?
The size and diversity of the special partnership China and Ethiopia have
forged raises the question of whether China could represent a polity devel-
opment model for Ethiopia. The question is in fact more complex than it
might seem at first.
Like many governments in developing countries, Ethiopia is openly se-
duced by China’s economic success, and Addis Ababa sees in the reforms
that Beijing introduced over the past three decades lessons for speeding up
its own development: an improvement of the business climate through the
opening of special economic zones, a call for foreign investments and a fillip
to exports, but also a cautious liberalisation of exchange rates and the fi-
nancial system as well as gradual and orderly integration with the global
economy. Similarly, China’s mode of accession to the World Trade Organi-
sation could be useful for Ethiopia. In fact, Ethiopia’s Growth Transformation
Plan 2010-2015 is inspired largely by the strategies followed by countries
such as Malaysia and Singapore since the 1960s; also, its agriculture mod-
ernisation programme and mode of state intervention draw on the experi-
ences of Taiwan, South Korea, and more recently, China. Finally, and
worryingly, Ethiopia also seems to be interested in the monopolistic prac-
tices of Chinese state-owned groups and has blocked any economic liber-
alisation moves. Beijing, for its part, goes along with this growing
enthusiasm for the “Chinese model,” not by seeking to “sell” its “turnkey”
formula but by issuing numerous invitations to Ethiopia’s official, economic,
and intellectual elites to visit China, and by actively promoting political and
trade relations.
In brief, more than Europe’s or America’s, it is Asia’s development model
that constitutes a real attraction for the Ethiopian regime.
But Ethiopia, unlike other African countries (Ghana, Senegal, Zambia, etc.), is
60 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 2 / 4
52. See Deborah Brautigam and Xiaoyang Tang, “China’s Investments in Special Economic Zones in
Africa,” in Thomas Farole and Gokhan Akinci (eds.), Special Economic Zones: Progress, Emerging
Challenges and Future Directions, Washington DC, World Bank, 2011, pp. 69-100, especially pp. 76-
77.
53. After this incident, the Ethiopian regime launched a military offensive in the Ogaden, which led
to a humanitarian crisis and provoked the expulsion of international NGOs.
54. William Davison, “PetroTrans May Face Attack in Ethiopia Oil Search, Group Says,”
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-09/petrotrans-may-face-attack-in-ethiopia-oil-
search-group-says.html (consulted on 6 November 2012).
55. The Economist, 21 May 2009.
56. Deborah Braütigam and Xiaoyang Tang, An Overview of China’s Agricultural and Rural Engagement
in Ethiopia, Washington DC, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01185, May 2012.
57. Alemayehu Geda, “Scoping Study on the Chinese Relation with Sub Saharan Africa: The Case of
Ethiopia,” AERC Scoping Study, Nairobi, March 2008, pp. 4, 11-12.
58. See South-South Cooperation: Africa and the new forms of development partnership, Economic
Development in Africa, Report 2010, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New
York/Geneva, 2010.
Article
going further in embracing the authoritarian development model China advo-
cates. As a severe critic of “neo-liberalism” raging in the West and of the mar-
ket’s excesses, Meles had nothing but admiration for his country’s main Asian
partner. His successor, Hailemariam Desalegn, as foreign minister and deputy
prime minister in 2010, had openly called for following the “Chinese model.”(59)
In fact, there are a number of political and institutional convergences between
the two countries: the EPRDF’s status as the ruling and quasi-single party to
which the army is subordinated, land as public property, the hegemonic role
of village authorities (kebele) and EPRDF local committees, tight control over
political activities and especially over the Internet, not to mention the long
imperial and administrative traditions the two countries share.
But these convergences have their limits: the Meles government and the
EPRDF have been modelled more on Singapore or Putin’s Russia. Through
all sorts of intimidations, stronger and more effective than in 2005, Meles
managed to weaken and even marginalise the opposition during the May
2010 parliamentary elections. But the EPRDF has no plans, nor any need,
to steer the regime towards a one-party system. There are many dissuasive
factors: the human tragedy that marked the years of Mengistu’s regime, the
existence of a legal and “loyal” albeit divided opposition, Addis Ababa’s de-
sire to speed the return of an affluent diaspora that is often critical of the
regime’s authoritarian tendency, as well as Ethiopia’s persisting dependence
on traditional donors such as the United States ($1 billion per year), the EU
($838 million in the 2008-2013 period), and Japan ($100 million), and the
continuing closeness of its relations with the West, where most Ethiopian
students are trained. And much more than China’s Communist Party, the
EPRDF has to ensure regional ethnic representation to reflect the human
mosaic of a country with a federal structure (not only Tigreans and the
Amhara, who dominate the political scene, but also the Oromo, the Somalis,
the Afars, and the southern people).
China’s entry on the Ethiopian scene and its contribution to the country’s
development has undeniably strengthened the authoritarian regime’s hand.
Like some other African (or authoritarian) countries, the Ethiopian govern-
ment has also tried to used its partnership with China as a lever to dissuade
the West from applying too much pressure over human rights issues. This
was the case after the merely provisional and symbolic suspension of EU
assistance following irregularities and violence during the 2005 elections.
It has remained the case since 2010.
But then, the West’s hesitation in suspending assistance depends less on
China than on the extent of Ethiopia’s poverty and on the country’s strate-
gic role in East Africa as an ally against terrorist movements or in efforts to
stabilise Somalia and now South Sudan.
Difficulties considered minimal
The Sino-Ethiopian partnership is not without its thorns. They stem in part
from the nature and priorities of Beijing’s diplomatic and economic activities
not only in Ethiopia but in the whole of Africa. They also result from the
modalities of Chinese enterprises’ implantation in developing countries. In
this sense, Ethiopia is no exception. Finally, they are also linked to the diffi-
culties of the local terrain and Addis Ababa’s own objectives. However, for
the foreseeable future, these difficulties are unlikely to hurt the “Sino-opti-
mism” of the majority of Ethiopians, to use Adem’s expression.
First of all, China’s cooperation and assistance all too often come with po-
litical and economic strings attached and are also opaque. Moreover, China
expects its friends in Africa and elsewhere to support it on major interna-
tional issues and to observe “omerta” on all touchy subjects (such as human
rights and Tibet).
But it is in the economic and commercial areas that China’s assistance
more directly serves its own interests. Although overall, Chinese cooperation
and infrastructure projects directly contribute towards accelerating
Ethiopia’s development, they are often entrusted, without calling for ten-
ders, to Chinese state entities chosen by Beijing as part its global strategy
of boosting the might of these firms in the international arena. Even when
tenders are invited and international (especially European) financing is se-
cured, subsidised, and supported by their political authorities, Chinese com-
panies are in a better position to quote a more attractive price and capture
the market. Thus, using practices that border on dumping, Chinese enter-
prises have managed to neutralise competition, especially from Japan and
South Korea in the road-building sector. (60) The Ethiopian government’s im-
mediate interests are not necessarily threatened by these practices: it is ac-
tually able to build more kilometres of roads at a lower cost. But its overall
interest is in allowing rather than blocking competition.
Chinese projects also add to Ethiopia’s trade deficit and present it with a major
cost in financial and at times environmental terms. In fact, as elsewhere, the
funding conditions are rarely published and international organisations (IMF
and World Bank) admit they have great difficulty finding them out. And due to
restrictions it imposes on competitors (“single sourcing”), Chinese cooperation
is not necessarily less onerous that that from other partners of Ethiopia, and
increases its debt in a way that could prove burdensome in the long term.
Moreover, the most delicate and controversial aspect, common to China’s
cooperation with developing countries, is that infrastructure projects in
Ethiopia are carried out with major Chinese labour input. The enterprises en-
gaged thus give Chinese technicians jobs that are often more attractive than
in China and help export excess workforce to other developing countries. They
thereby create a well-known problem common to many African countries,
and which has the potential to negatively affect Sino-Ethiopian relations.
While official figures showed the presence in Ethiopia of about 20,000
Chinese engineers, technicians, and workers in 2011, those engaged in major
projects cited above estimate the actually numbers at 100,000 at least. (61)
Although Addis Ababa claims to pay great attention to the numbers of
workers engaged in each project, in reality it has a weak hand in imposing
its will. Moreover, be they Chinese workers who stay on in Ethiopia at the
end of their contracts or those who arrive in the guise of “tourists” to make
money, the rapid growth of the Chinese community provokes frequent vent-
ing of resentment by local people, who are mostly poor or under-employed.
Further, technology transfer falls short of Ethiopian expectations. This is
often the case with Chinese enterprises’ investment projects. (62) According
to several accounts, this has led to a growing frustration that Beijing does
not seem to fully appreciate.
The other criticism, in Ethiopia’s case, is the poor quality of Chinese-sup-
plied infrastructure, technology, and equipment. Moreover, the Ethiopian
government considers actual investment by Chinese enterprises in the man-
ufacturing sector to be too low, despite some positive evolution lately.
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Another limitation of Chinese activity is that it favours state entities and
official elites: no exception in Ethiopia. Contrary to Western assistance, that
from China does not yet cover civil society; it was not until 2010 that
Ethiopian NGOs were invited for short trips to China. Some NGO represen-
tatives have expressed concern over the nature and modalities of Chinese
assistance, but Addis Ababa has blocked all public debate over the issue; crit-
icisms, albeit numerous, are therefore confined to private conversation. (63)
Finally, in the diplomatic domain and for the economic and strategic rea-
sons noted above, the close Sino-Ethiopian partnership has not really led
to a weakening of Addis Ababa’s links with its main partners. Apart from
Western countries and Japan, Ethiopia enjoys cordial political relations and
close economic, technical, and cultural cooperation with countries of the
South such as India, Turkey, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia.
For China too, Ethiopia is not without its frustrations common to Africa.
Administrative corruption is less of a problem in Ethiopia than in other
African countries. However, the lack of efficiency and dysfunction in the
bureaucracy, frequent electricity breakdowns, often defective infrastructure,
difficulties in obtaining foreign exchange for enterprises set up in the coun-
try, state interference in the choice of local partners, daily problems in com-
munication with the ill-trained local workforce, and the backwardness of
economic structures stemming from the Ethiopian way of life pose obsta-
cles to fruitful and harmonious cooperation.
Nevertheless, the Ethiopian experience has also revealed the ability for
adaptation and correction of the Chinese partners (in a larger sense) that is
often overlooked. This is illustrated by the opening of the Dukmen industrial
park and the recent rise in Chinese investment in Ethiopia’s export sector.
And although there are few indications of this yet, the large-scale recourse
to the Chinese workforce could also change, if only because Chinese workers
are becoming more expensive and less useful to the extent that Ethiopians,
including technicians, are being trained to take over.
Conclusion
There is no denying that China and Ethiopia have since 1995, and partic-
ularly over the last ten years, built an especially close diplomatic and eco-
nomic partnership and that it is expected to be an enduring one,
contributing directly to weakening the influence of other major powers ac-
tive in the Horn of Africa such as the United States, the EU, and Japan, and
curbing the ambitions of other emerging countries such as India. (64)
China has clearly raised Ethiopia to a privileged partner status in Africa.
But contrary to the dominant pattern, Chinese motivations in the country
are not mainly economic: Ethiopia is not among the group of major suppli-
ers of raw material to the “workshop of the world”; above all, the motiva-
tions are diplomatic, strategic, and even ideological. Of course, the size of
infrastructure and industrial projects also adheres to an economic and com-
mercial logic of promoting Chinese companies’ rising might. But for the Chi-
nese authorities, cultivating their counterparts in the second most populous
African country, the main power in the sub-region, and host of the African
Union headquarters, is also a lever to build its influence on the whole con-
tinent. Meles Zenawi’s personal role and prestige also contributed to this.
And although the Chinese Communist Party is discreet over the issue of ex-
porting its “model,” it cannot be indifferent to the Ethiopian regime’s ad-
miration for the success of its authoritarian development strategy: it
contributes to strengthening or at least safeguarding its international legit-
imacy and consequently, China’s “soft power.” Thus, in Ethiopia’s case, eco-
nomic and commercial cooperation is not so much an end in itself but
above all is a means for the Chinese state to realise its objectives.
For the Ethiopian side, partnership with China conforms as much to its do-
mestic as to its international priorities. It contributes to consolidating the
EPRDF’s hold on the political system and the army, directly favours economic
development, diversifies its funding sources, and increases its elbow room in
often difficult negotiations with its traditional donors. Historically, this part-
nership is in some way a continuation and (tardy) success of the strategy of
cooperation that Haile Selassie pursued with Japan in the years 1920-1930.
This double convergence of interests, domestic and external, political and
economic, is present not only between China and Africa but also among
most developing and undemocratic countries (in Central Asia, for instance).
However, what is exceptional in Ethiopia’s case is the strong strategic and
even ideological dimension of the partnership.
Nevertheless, questions remain over the extent and the future of this spe-
cial relationship.
On the one hand, it is important to bear in mind that China has con-
tributed to opening the game but in general has been unable to close it ad-
vantageously. Although Hailemariam Desalegn and his party apparently
want to pursue the work and policies of Meles, they nevertheless have no
wish to transpose the Chinese model without reviewing it, nor do they wish
to strengthen more than necessary the strategic collusion with Beijing. For
Ethiopia, relations with traditional partners remain vital, although China’s
entry and method of operation has had a major bearing on development
projects. It is unclear as yet whether this new factor will lead Americans and
Europeans to review their priorities and see merit in the logic of competition
reminiscent of the one that prevailed with the Soviet camp during the Cold
War. But in Ethiopia as elsewhere, the issue has already been raised.
On the other hand, as in the rest of Africa, China’s presence in Ethiopia is
a “double-edged sword.” (65) For the present and in the foreseeable future,
the Ethiopian government and a section of the country’s elite will see it as
a welcome and irreplaceable accelerator for development. But the question
arises whether in due course, and aware of the risks of over-dependence on
Beijing, Addis Ababa would not wish to open out in other directions and
distance itself from China. Obviously, such an eventuality depends on sev-
eral factors, especially internal political changes in both China and Ethiopia.
The conclusion that may be drawn from this study is that in its relations
with Beijing, Addis Ababa is not in as vulnerable a state as many of its neigh-
bours. In any case, the Chinese as well as other partners of Ethiopia would
be mistaken in underestimating the nationalism of a proud and ambitious
people who attach the highest priority to emerging from the most extreme
poverty and to achieving economic modernisation.
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